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Ordinary / Extraordinary Means 
and Euthanasia 
John P. Mullooly, M.D. 
This article by Linacre's editor, who is immediate past president of the 
State Medical Society of Wisconsin is reprinted with the permission of the 
Wisconsin Medical J oumal, March, 1987. 
Mrs. G. was a beautiful, vivacious lady with a wonderful family. One 
day, she developed a splitting headache. She had had headaches before, 
but nothing like this. She called her husband who immedicately came 
home and found her unconscious on the floor in the kitchen, next to the 
phone. He called paramedics, and within minutes, his wife was rushed to 
the emergency room of the community hospital. Hasty examination 
showed that she was in deep coma with a dilated pupil on the right, rigid 
extremities and a Babinski sign on the left. 
Because of respiratory distress, she was intubated, given oxygen, and 
taken to Radiology where a computerized tomographic (CT) scan of the 
brain revealed a massive intracerebral hemorrhage in the right 
hemisphere. 
During the next 72 hours, the patient stabilized and she could be 
extubated, although she remained in a coma. Tube feeding was begun and 
intravenous infusions were discontinued. Physical therapy was instituted 
and appropriate nursing care continued. After three weeks ,of continued 
coma, it was obvious that nursing home placement was in order, and she 
was transferred to the appropriate facility where she resides to this day. 
Fortunately, the financial resources and insurance of the family are 
more than adequate for the care ofthe patient. Her husband has visited her 
every day and continues to hope for her recovery. Her children have 
likewise been most supportive of their father and pray daily for their 
mother to recover. 
However, the grim prospect of no chance for recovery has begun to 
dawn upon the husband, for it has been many months since this 
catastrophe occurred. He asks himself, "What is my obligation to my 
wife?" The doctors give him no encouragement in regard to his wife's 
prognosis. He is grateful that insurance is lightening the financial burden, 
but when the insurance runs out, what is he to do? What are the obligations 
which must be fulfilled? In short, what does a good man do in this morally 
perplexing situation? 
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If this scenario seems familiar, it can be repeated many times over in 
these United States. Generally speaking, a patient is under no obligation to 
use extraordinary means to take care of his health, but he must use 
ordinary means. A crucial distinction is important to make here: it is the 
patient who determines what is extraordinary for him or her, and not his 
physician. What may be ordinary for the physician may be extraordinary 
for the patient. For example, a physician might think that renal dialysis in 
this day and age is very ordinary treatment for a patient in renal failure . 
For the patient it may represent quite an extraordinary route to follow. 
The patient's perception must be followed , assuming that the patient's 
judgment and mental facilities are intact. 
In the application of the ordinary/ extraordinary approach to clinical 
decision-making, it is vital for us to determine what is extraordinary. 
The usual distinctions are: (1) excessive pain and / or disability; (2) 
economic considerations, eg, cost of care which would impoverish a 
family; and (3) benefits outweighed by the risks. 
While the outlining of these ethical rules is clear enough, the application 
of them is sometimes very difficult. This is so because sometimes the 
clinical facts are not yet clear. Sometimes the patient is so confused and 
upset that rational, coherent, logical thought is impossible. Nevertheless, 
having a clear set of ethical criteria is essential for the physician if he is to 
behave ethically. 
By far, one of the best helps to the physician in doing his job is a 
knowledge of the patient and the family. There is no substitute for this, as 
he brings profound insight to the wishes of the patient and the family. The 
relationships which he has forged over the years with the patient will serve 
him well when he is faced with having to make difficult clinical decisions 
on whether to institute or withhold extraordinary measures. How often 
have we been faced with decisions that house staff have made for our 
patients at a time of crisis, with which decisions we disagree? Many times, 
the house staff, acting in good faith, did what they thought was correct. 
But we know that, had we been there, we might have done things 
differently, based upon our knowledge of the patient and his wishes. 
I vividly recall a patient who entered the hospital emergency room 
comatose and in a state of seizure. I had known him for years. His whole 
life had been one of tremendous activity and accomplishment. The CT 
scan showed a massive intracerebral hemorrhage and his prognosis was 
zero. The family was informed and very supportive. At that time we 
decided that no extraordinary means would be used, as it was obvious that 
they would be of no avail and would simply prolong the process of dying. 
Despite orders to the contrary, a resident inserted an endotracheal tube 
when the patient exhibited respiratory distress. I was informed and 
ordered it removed, after talking to the family again. The patient died 
shortly thereafter. Knowing this patient and the family so well made the 
decision easy. Had the resident been aware or made himself aware of the 
entire situation, he probably would not have embarked upon the 
extraordinary procedure. 
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In regard to patients who are in the process of dying, when their demise 
is only days or weeks away, it is obvious that extraordinary means are out 
ofthe question. Our principal duty is to support the patient and the family. 
Pain control is essential. With the continuous morphine infusion pumps 
which even the patients can regulate, pain can be alleviated or certainly 
ameliorated to a great degree. Even if the dosage of analgesia contributes 
to the demise of the patient, a physician or nurse should not feel culpable, 
as the intent was to relieve pain, and not to cause the death of the patient. 
In regard to fluids and nutrition in the imminently dying patient, 
problems can be found. When the intravenous fluid infiltrates, or the 
patient runs out of veins, or the vein becomes infected, what is one to do? 
Consultation with the family is in order. If it is not feasible to use 
intravenous fluids, they should be discontinued. What about nasogastric 
tubes, and / or gastronomy tubes? Again, if in consultation with this family 
these modalities are not feasible, they should be discontinued; and the 
patient should be taken care of with the usual nursing care until he or she 
dies. Emotional care and support are the keystone for the imminently 
dying patient. 
What does one do for the patient who is not dying, but who is 
permanently comatose and probably on intravenous fluids or tube feeding 
and in a nursing home? This is a most difficult and perplexing question. As 
long as the patient receives nutrition and water, he or she will live. If the 
patient does not receive these, he or she will surely die. What is our 
obligation in these circumstances? Food and water are ordinary 
requirements for life. To deprive a person of these requirements is morally 
wrong. However, suppose that, in virtue ofthe fact that food and water are 
artificially given, ie, via feeding or gastronomy tubes or intravenous 
feedings, we have created an extraordinary means to keep this patient 
alive? Suppose the cost of these artificial modalities, with the attendant 
nursing care, becomes a tremendous financial burden on the family-must 
this obligation continue to be fulfilled? 
In light of the previous distinction, I think not, as exce~sive financial 
burden certainly puts this into the extraordinary means realm. As pointed 
out before, extraordinary means are never obligatory to the patient, 
physician, or relatives. 
In a very finely nuanced ethical analysis of the above ethical question, 
Thomas J. O'Donnell, S.J., in the Medical-Moral Newsletter of February 
1987, states that it is "inappropriate, however, to refer to 'feeding' without 
distinguishing between natural and artificial nutrition and hydration. 
"The difference between normal eating and drinking and the artificial 
(intravenous, nasogastric, etc.) delivery of nutrition and hydration is 
clearly evident in the difference between eating in a restaurant and being 
nourished in intensive care. The question is: How morally significant is this 
difference? Or more specifically: Are both natural and artificial nutrition 
and hydration to be considered as always ordinary means of prolonging 
life, and therefore obligatory (unless their burden to the patient, or even to 
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others, would clearly outweigh their benefit)? NOTE: The last parentheses 
are included because it would seem that all moral theologians would admit 
that the burden-benefit calculus in a particular case could render the 
means extraordinary; certainly in the case of artificial feeding and even in 
the case of natural feeding when that would be extremely painful and/ or 
even dangerous to the patient, as it could be in some cases. 
" ... we would hold that, at least in the case of incurable pathology 
accompanied by definitely established irreversible coma and the attendant 
inability to take food and water normally, artificial provision of nutrition 
and hydration could be withheld or withdrawn either because the burden 
of continuing treatment would be disproportionate to the benefit, or 
because their continuation would be judged not to be clinically significant 
or therapeutic. 
"It is important to note that in the situation of incurable pathology 
accompanied by-irreversible coma, the purpose (intention) to cause death 
by withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration is unacceptable since 
that would be 'euthanasia by intention.' Nor is withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration the cause of death. The cause of death is the 
irreversible disease, which has caused both the terminal coma and the 
inability to eat and drink. Since death would occur in the same way and 
from the same cause if artificial nutrition and hydration were unavailable 
or had never been started, they might be seen as an intervention that is 
artificially interrupting an independently occurring process. Thus, rather 
than causing death, their withdrawal accurately could be viewed as letting 
inchoative death occur. 
"In any discussion of ordinary and extraordinary means of prolonging 
life in terminal illness, it seems reasonable and necessary to introduce a 
category of 'minimal means' which must always be used, because to 
withhold them when they can be received is equivalent to a positive act of 
destruction. By these we mean food and water taken normally as distinct 
from the clinical modalities of IV needles, gastric tupes, hyperalimentation 
formulae, etc. Much of the current confusion in the discussion of 
withholding nutrition and hydration results from the failure to make this 
distinction. " 
Perhaps this is the stance of the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs' Opinion of 1986, in which it is stated that artificial hydration and 
nutrition may be discontinued in the permanently comatose patient along 
with other medical intervention. In issuing this Opinion, it would have 
avoided much confusion if the proper distinction alluded to above had 
been published along with the Opinion. 
While the above ethical distinctions of ordinary/ extraordinary means 
are quite clear in regard to nutrition and hydration, Mark Siegler, MD and 
Alan J. Weisbard JDl pointed out in 1984 that the "powerful rhetoric of 
death with dignity has gained intellectual currency and practical 
importance in recent years." They stated in their article that "the death 
with dignity movement advanced to a new frontier: the termination or 
withdrawal of fluids and nutritional support." 
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Siegler felt that this was an unexpected development and ran contrary to 
the traditions of medical care, and he called for further debate on the 
subject. After describing current thinking on the subject, he alludes to a 
New England Journal of Medicine article in which a group of 
distinguished clinicians advocated the withholding of parenteral fluids and 
nutritional support from severely and irreversibly demented patients and 
perhaps, at times, from elderly patients with permanent mild impairment 
of competence (a group to which they refer as "pleasantly senile").2 
Siegler offers several arguments against this stream of opinions to 
discontinue fluids. He feels that patients will be protected against 
diagnostic errors, inadequate treatment, and unscrupulous care for 
financial or other reasons. 
Furthermore, he states that physicians would not be forced to make ad 
hoc, value-laden decisions nor would they be forced to act in violation of 
their conscience in regard to standards of care. "Physicians also would be 
spared the direct causal responsibility for the death of the patient and the 
inevitable psychological association of this practice with active 
euthanasia. " 
He warns that the "primary commitment of physicians to patients might 
be compromised and the image of physicians tarnished at precisely the 
time when physicians must establish the primacy of quality of care and not 
become overwhelmed by cost-containment efforts which run contrary to 
good clinical medicine." 
Siegler states that "society's larger interest would be preserved by 
rejecting the movement toward discontinuation of fluids in the dying 
patient because it sows the seeds of unacceptable consequences." We have 
witnessed too much history to disregard how easily society may disvalue 
the lives of the "unproductive." The "angel of mercy" can become the 
fanatic, bringing the "comfort" of death to some who do not clearly want 
it, then to others who "would really be better off dead," and finally, to 
undesirable persons, "which might involve the tern¥nally ill, the 
permanently unconscious, the severely senile, the retarded, the incurably 
and chronically ill, and, perhaps, the aged." While the allusions are to Nazi 
Germany, Siegler'S concerns are reinforced by the "coming together of the 
emerging stream of medical and ethical opinion with the torrent of public 
and governmental concern with the cost of medical care. Cost containment 
strategies may impose significant financial penalties on those who provide 
prolonged care for the impaired elderly. In the current environment it may 
well prove convenient-all too easy-to move from an individual's "right 
to die" to a climate enforcing a "duty to die." 
As we move into the waning years of the 20th century and look over the 
medical environment and the direction in which it is heading, in my 
estimation, Siegler's apprehensions seem to be justified. As he concludes 
his article, he avows that this issue of withdrawing fluids and hydration is 
most complicated, "the tradition of medicine to do no harm is long, and a 
slow, conservative approach is most advisable." He feels that "com-
passionate calls for withdrawing of fluids in a few selected cases bears the 
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seeds of great potential abuse. Little is to be lost and much to be gained by 
slowing down the process, by taking stock of where we have come from 
and where we are going, by improving our methods of comforting and 
caring for the dying without necessarily hUrrying to dispatch them on their 
way, and by deferring any premature legal, ethical, or professional 
approval and legitimization of this new course. Continuing to administer 
fluids, even to dying patients, provides an important clinical, psycho-
logical, and social barrier that should be retained." 
Does Siegler's approach seem viable in these times? With the continued 
barrage from government, business, and industry on cost containment, the 
medical profession is on the defensive. As Siegler points out, there is a 
growing acceptance for this among physicians, ethicians, philosophers 
and, of course, the Euthanasia Society of America. It behooves us all to 
ponder the implications of Siegler's arguments, to hone our ethical skills, 
to use the ethical guidelines of the AMA with great caution, and to remain 
close to the patient and his or her family. 
When all is said and done in ethical matters, this is where the action is. If 
the physician treats his patient as he himself would like to be treated , if he 
does no harm, then he has fulfilled his obligation to his patient with a clear 
conscience. Continued discussion and debate are essential to further 
clarify this most difficult and perplexing ethical question. 
The reason that the food and water element is so important in the 
comatose patient is because it isolates a problem upon which we can focus 
to make some telling points. We know that the patient, although 
comatose, will live if fed , even though it is artificially done. Assuming that 
this is ordinary means, the patient will continue to live until some other 
pathological process supervenes. If nutrition is withdrawn, the patient will 
surely die in a short time. If a family or physician wishes to dispense with 
these ordinary means, the intent of the family or physician must be 
examined. Do they wish the patient to die and accomplish this by 
removing the only things which keep him living, namely food and water? 
Or do they simply want to let him die? If we asstIme that fluids and 
nutrition, artificially given, are ordinary means, and these supports are 
withdrawn, then we are talking about euthanasia by omission. On the 
other hand, if they can be categorized as extraordinary, then no obligation 
exists. 
In a larger context, however, it would be well for us to ponder histor 
and what it is warning us about when we consider the above. There have 
been and are various movements in this century and in our own time which 
are very disturbing to physicians who cherish their medical ethic, to do no 
harm. When we contemplate what happened to people in the Third Reich 
in the 1930s and 1940s, where mental defectives were eliminated as being 
unfit to live, and have this escalated to include the Jews and political 
dissidents; when we see where these euthanasia programs were begun by 
elements in the German medical professions and brought to terrifying 
proportions by that evil man, Hitler; when we see that life is being devalued 
in our society by the sickening statistics which come in each year on 
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elective abortions (20,000,000 since 1972), it must be obvious to even the 
most insensitive that we, as physicians, should be on guard. We should not 
be lulled into complacency by bland words or by double-talk. There is a 
drive for euthanasia going on in this country-euthanasia not simply by 
omission but by commission. If you doubt it, I would remind you that such 
legislation has been introduced into the California Legislature. The 
various courts have not been very supportive of us and some opinions have 
a most chilling impact on us and our medical ethics; eg, the Compton 
decision in the Bouvia case. Elizabeth Bouvia wished to die by starvation 
and wished the physicians and hospital to help her accomplish this. The 
hospital refused and the case came to court. Judge Compton in denying the 
hospital position stated the following: 
"Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that 
she prefers death to continued existence in her helpless and, to her, 
intolerable condition. I believe she has an absolute right to effectuate that 
decision. The state and the medical profession instead of frustrating her 
desire, should be attempting t'o relieve her suffering by permitting and in 
fact assisting her to die with ease and dignity. The fact that she is forced to 
suffer the ordeal of self-starvation to achieve her objective is in itself 
inhumane. 
"The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own 
destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected. That right should, 
in my opinion, include the ability to enlist assistance from others, 
including the medical profession in making death as painless and quick as 
possible. 
"That ability should not be hampered by the state's threat to impose 
legal sanctions on those who might be disposed to lend assistance. 
"The medical profession, freed of the threat of governmental or legal 
reprisal, would, I am sure, have no difficulty in accommodating an 
individual in Elizabeth's situation." 
In short, Judge Compton wishes that the medical profession would 
forsake its medical ethic and kill the patient if she so desires. What a 
perversion of legal thought and abasement of judicial prudence! 
I In summing up, the good physician must be the patient advocate to the 
end, even until death, do no harm and be aware of those who are trying to 
manipulate and corrupt his medical ethic. We are living in hard times for 
the medical profession, but when all is said and done, all we have left is our 
dedication and unswerving adherence to our Hippocratic Oath. How 
much money we made, how well our family has done, how many papers we 
have written, how many deliveries we have made, how many surgeries we 
have performed, will be as nothing if we have compromised on our solemn 
oath to do no harm. For it is on this oath and our adherence to it that we 
find our identity, our reason for being, and our worth as a physician. 
It is upon our adherence to our oath that we will be judged. Let us hope 
that we of this generation will not be found wanting! 
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